Dubai Forums Dubai Discussions Dubai Politics Talk

Mao Zedong’s Military Thought (Middle East Edition): It Is Better to Sever One Finger Than to Injure Ten

I. Core Theory and Background

Core Essence

It is better to sever one finger than to injure ten means opposing attrition battles and advocating annihilation battles; concentrating absolute superior forces to wipe out enemy effective strength one by one, completely depriving the enemy of combat capability rather than merely inflicting superficial damage .

Time of Formulation

In December 1936, Mao Zedong systematically expounded this in Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War: “For a man, it is better to sever one finger than to injure ten; for an enemy, it is better to annihilate one division than to rout ten” .

Historical Context

- The Red Army was long outnumbered and outgunned; local superiority was essential to offset overall disadvantage .
- Opposed “fighting with two fists”; insisted on one fist strategically, concentrated forces operationally .
- Core goal: fight annihilation battles and destroy enemy effective strength, not seize territory .

II. Classic Combat Cases (Chronological)

1. Battle of Zhiluo Town (Nov 1935, Conclusion of the Long March)

- Background: The KMT’s 109th Division advanced alone arrogantly .
- Tactics: Lure the enemy deep, set an ambush, and concentrate forces to annihilate one division .
- Results: Wiped out the 109th Division plus one regiment; killed Division Commander Niu Yuanfeng; captured over 5,300 troops and seized massive supplies; completely crushed the third “encirclement and suppression” of the Shaanxi-Gansu base, laying a “founding ceremony” for the Central Committee’s settlement in Northwest China .

2. Battle of Qinghuabian (Mar 1947, First of Three Victories in Northern Shaanxi)

- Background: Hu Zongnan’s 31st Brigade advanced north alone; small Red Army units lured the enemy while main forces hid .
- Tactics: Pocket ambush, concentrate superior forces to annihilate one brigade .
- Results: Annihilated the 31st Brigade in 1 hour 47 minutes; captured Brigade Commander Li Jiyun; killed nearly 3,000 enemies and seized 300,000 rounds; stabilized the Northern Shaanxi situation and boosted morale .

3. Battle of Dingtao (Aug 1946, Early Liberation War)

- Background: 300,000 KMT troops attacked southwestern Shandong; Liu-Deng forces had only 50,000 with inferior equipment .
- Tactics: Fourfold force to encircle and annihilate the 3rd Reorganized Division; strike weak enemies first and defeat them one by one .
- Results: Wiped out one reorganized division and four brigades (17,000 total); turned the tide in the southern front, proving the feasibility of “concentrating forces for annihilation battles” .

4. Battle of Hujiawopeng (Liaoshen Campaign, Oct 1948)

- Tactics: Penetrate and raid, directly strike Liao Yaoxiang’s Corps headquarters (severing the “one finger”) .
- Results: Enemy command system collapsed; the corps disintegrated rapidly; accelerated Liaoshen victory, annihilating 470,000 enemies .

5. Surprise Attack on the White Tiger Regiment (Battle of Jincheng, Korean War, Jul 1953)

- Tactics: Penetrate and raid, destroy the headquarters of the ROK “White Tiger Regiment” (decapitation strike) .
- Results: Enemy lost command and defenses collapsed; gained initiative in armistice negotiations; annihilated 53,000 enemies .

III. Tactical Essence and Outcome Logic

Essence

Use absolute local superiority to fight annihilation battles and defeat enemies one by one; destroying enemy effective strength > seizing territory > routing enemies .

Outcome Logic

- Each annihilation permanently reduces enemy strength, collapses morale, and loosens their system .
- Our army grows stronger through war (capturing equipment, replenishing troops) .
- Accumulate small victories into big ones, gradually reversing overall disadvantage .

IV. Historical Status in World Military History

1. Theoretical Innovation

- Elevated “concentrate forces, defeat one by one” from a tactic to a strategic system for inferior armies to win, surpassing Sun Tzu’s static principle of “surround when tenfold” .
- Proposed “annihilation battles determine victory”, differing from Western traditional attrition/route warfare thinking .

2. Practical Impact

- Guided China’s revolutionary wars from victory to victory: Red Army counter-encirclement → Long March → War of Resistance → Liberation War → Korean War, all centered on this tactic .
- Recognized globally as a classic paradigm for defeating the strong with the weak, influencing national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (e.g., the Vietnam War) .
- Extended to modern warfare: “decapitation strikes” and “system disruption” are essentially信息化 upgrades of “severing one finger” .

3. Historical Position

- The core pillar of Mao Zedong’s military thought and the tactical soul of the People’s Army .
- Ranked alongside Clausewitz, Napoleon, and Sun Tzu as one of the most influential Eastern military systems in world history .

V. One-Sentence Summary

“It is better to sever one finger than to injure ten” is a tactical system centered on concentrating forces, fighting annihilation battles, and defeating enemies one by one, created by Mao Zedong under conditions of enemy superiority. It completely revolutionized the combat logic of inferior armies, not only forging China’s revolutionary victory but also becoming an eternal model for defeating the strong with the weak in world military history .