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Introduction

This estimate of Israelis and Arab military capabilities was prepared just prior to the Six day war on May 26, 1967 by the United Stated Central Intelligence Agency, National Board of Estimates.

An alternative estimate or a censored version of this one was apparently prepared on the same day. That estimate has sometimes been cited as "proof" that Israel was not in any danger and that the US and Israel knew this to be the case. Between 50,000 (US estimate) and 100,000 (Israeli estimate) Egyptian troops had been moved into Sinai by May 25. The US estimate of five divisions, given below, would be consistent with a force of about 75,000. Israeli intelligence warnings on the same day as this estimate was delivered, had warned of an imminent Egyptian attack, while the US repeated cautioned Israel not to initiate a pre-emptive strike. Israel had dug 10,000 graves and prepared about 14,000 hospital beds for casualties in preparation for the war.

The report makes the following interesting estimate:

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We estimate that armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double defense line in the Sinai within several days. Regrouping and resupplying would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period.

Had Israel had lost half its air force, regrouping and resupply would have been possible only if there were not serious loss of pilots, since it would be impossible to retrain pilots in this period. Airport runways would not be serviceable and there would be no way to service the aircraft and refuel them. Presumably, during this period, Israeli cities and strategic installations, including the Dimona nuclear reactor, would be open to Egyptian attack and Israel would have little effective air defense capability. As the Egyptians would probably have bombed Israeli ports and Lod Airport, resupply would have been difficult. In the event they had hit the nuclear reactor, the strike might have spread a great deal of radiation, in which case there might have been little point to resupply.

In the event, Israel struck first. However there is no way of knowing for certain what would have been the result if the Egyptians had struck first.

A far different estimate was delivered by the CIA's national board of estimates on the same day, stating that Israel had lost this round by failing to attack, and would suffer heavy losses if it attacked now, and what is critical, that Israel would not undertake the war without adequate assurance of resupply:

5. The Israelis face dismaying choices. Surprised and shaken by Nasser's action, they failed to take the instant military counteraction which might have been most effective. If they attack now they will face far more formidable opposition than in the rapid campaign of 1956. We believe that they would still be able to drive the Egyptians away from the entrance to the Strait of Tiran, but it would certainly cost them heavy losses of men and materiel. We are not sure that they have sufficient stockpiles of ammunition and equipment for a war lasting more than three or four weeks, and it is possible that they would not embark upon a major campaign without prior assurances from the US of adequate resupply.

The U.S. chose to believe and act on the first estimate, apparently because it was intent on restraining Israel from attacking first regardless of possible costs to Israel. The important part of this estimate, in the cynical calculus of the US, was apparently the conclusion that Israel would not attack as long it was not assured of resupply. Therefore, the US may have believed they could be reasonably assured that Israel would not and could not attack without a positive "green light" from the United States.

Other historians suggest this was the war that no one wanted, but which became inevitable nonetheless.

shafique wrote:New lessons from the Six-Day War / Documents show complex history before first shot
...
Documents from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas, reveal a history far more complex than the traditional narrative of the powerful Arabs aligned against a fragile Israel. On the contrary, as the smoke cleared on June 11, the outcome confirmed what these analysts already knew: The Arab armies were far from some fearsome juggernaut, and Israel would easily prevail.
..
Thirty-nine years later, the traditional explanation for Israel's surprise attack -- that the Jewish state was threatened by 100,000 Egyptian troops poised along the border of the Sinai Peninsula, and had to attack Nasser's forces or be destroyed -- withers under historical scrutiny.

...
Despite these moves, in 1967 the Egyptian president repeatedly demonstrated a strong aversion to war -- a fact ignored in the traditional David vs. Goliath re-telling of Middle Eastern history. Again and again, Nasser told Western and Soviet diplomats he had no intention of attacking Israel, and intelligence reports from May 1967 support this.

Multiple U.S. and British spy agencies indicated the Israeli numbers of 100,000 Egyptian troops were highly inflated. The CIA, in a May 22 memorandum, declared Egyptian troop strength at 50,000 men, and characterized Nasser's Sinai forces as "defensive in character." Rostow called the Israeli estimates "highly disturbing," and the CIA concluded that they were part of a "political gambit intended to influence the U.S."

..
By early June, however, Israel had become convinced that war was inevitable. Following a cabinet shakeup, Meir Amit, the Mossad (Israeli spy agency) director, embarked on another trip to Washington, where he would recall telling Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that "I, Meir Amit, am going to recommend that our government strike." According to Amit, McNamara, preoccupied with Vietnam, asked him how long a war would last. "Seven days," the Mossad director responded.

The Americans concurred: Nasser's forces were too weak, and the Arab armies too disorganized, to prevail against a powerful Israel. As U.S. undersecretary of state Nicholas Katzenbach would recall, "The intelligence was absolutely flat on the fact that the Israelis...could mop up the Arabs in no time at all."

event horizon wrote:

Introduction

This estimate of Israelis and Arab military capabilities was prepared just prior to the Six day war on May 26, 1967 by the United Stated Central Intelligence Agency, National Board of Estimates.

An alternative estimate or a censored version of this one was apparently prepared on the same day. That estimate has sometimes been cited as "proof" that Israel was not in any danger and that the US and Israel knew this to be the case.